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Until recently most militaries tended to see moral issues through the lens of rules and regulations. 
Today, however, many armed forces consider teaching virtues to be an important complement to 
imposing rules and codes from above. A closer look reveals that it is mainly established military 
virtues such as honour, courage and loyalty that dominate both the lists of virtues and values of most 
militaries and the growing body of literature on military virtues. Although there is evidently still a role 
for these traditional martial virtues, it is equally evident that they are not particularly relevant to, for 
instance, military personnel operating drones. This chapter looks into the ethics of unmanned 
warfare from the perspective of military virtues and military ethics education, and addresses the 
question of what we need to solve that just-mentioned misalignment: 1) a new set of virtues; 2) a 
different interpretation of the existing virtues; or 3) a different approach altogether, that is, an 
alternative to teaching virtues? That we have to think about such questions is at least partly because 
unmanned systems bring risk asymmetry in war to a new level, making warlike virtues such as 
physical courage by and large obsolete. The last section of this chapter therefore addresses the 
question: to what extent does the possibility of riskless warfare makes drone use ‘virtue-less’?  
 
Introduction  
Militaries are by tradition rule-guided organizations. And mostly for good reasons: setting rules 
makes clear to military personnel what they can and cannot do, and provides outsiders to the 
organization, say the local population in a mission area,  with some security regarding the way they 
are treated. An example is the prohibition of torture, a ban that is to be maintained regardless of 
how expedient it might be not to do so. Some decisions, and the matter of torture is again a good 
illustration of that (but so is the use of certain types of weapons, such as chemical and biological 
weapons, or expanding bullets), we rather do not leave to the discretion of the individual soldier. 
Rule-based ethics point to the importance of having universal, categorically binding moral norms. On 
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the other hand, such rule-based approaches have as an important downside that rules lack flexibility, 
and are often mostly ineffective when there are no witnesses around. Also, rule-following can 
impede the ability to see the moral aspect of what one is doing, while that ability is evidently 
essential  to morally sound decision-making. Hence that rules should leave soldiers with some leeway 
in that decision making, if only to keep them from committing so-called ‘crimes of obedience’ 
(Kelman and Hamilton 1989). It is probably for that reason that one text book on military ethics, 
meant for educating military personnel, unambiguously states that ‘in any situation where law and 
ethics set different standards, a member of the military profession will follow the higher standard, 
inevitably the one required by ethics’ (Coleman 2013, 268). 
Making good use of this leeway presupposes a good disposition, though, and it is at least 
partly for that reason that many militaries see a virtue-based approach to teaching military ethics as 
an important complement to rules imposed from above in their effort to make their personnel 
behave ethically. Where rule-based approaches, interpreted narrowly, mainly aim at securing 
compliance, virtue ethics asks for a lot more, including the kind of supererogatory acts the military 
depends on. What is more, virtue ethics assumes that character can be developed: virtues are to be 
understood as dispositions that can be acquired through training and practice.1 This appeals to many 
military trainers and educators because such an approach sits rather well with the way most 
militaries see themselves: as being in the business of character-building. Finally, virtue ethics is in 
keeping with the tendency of many Western militaries to move away in their ethics education from a 
largely functional approach towards a more aspirational approach that aims at making soldiers better 
persons, mainly based on the view that bad persons are not likely to form morally good soldiers – 
although they could of course still be effective ones (Robinson 2007; Wolfendale 2008, 164).   
In theory utilitarianism is a possible third candidate for underpinning the ethics education for 
military personnel,  but in practice it is seen by most as particularly unfit for that purpose, mostly  
because ‘an outcome-centred approach may lead all too easily to military expedience as the sole 
guide to actions in war’ (Bonadonna 1994, 18). Utilitarianism not only holds that we should base our 
judgment of whether an act is morally right or wrong (and hence also whether it should be done or 
not) upon the foreseen consequences, but also, much more revolutionary, that everyone’s life and 
happiness should weigh equally. Its critics seem to hold that utilitarianism is not bad per se, but that 
the utilitarian calculus is likely to be misapplied in a self-serving way.2 Military ethicist and political 
philosopher Michael Walzer has pointed out, as have many others, that the valuing of ‘each and 
every person’ in the same way will not work when ‘solidarity collapses’ (2004, 39). Precisely that is 
what happens in war, where we cannot but expect to see little willingness to take the consequences 
to all parties into account equally. 
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The ethics (and specifically the just war theory) that is to guide politicians and military 
decision makers during armed conflict consists of a mix of rule-based elements (such as the 
prohibition of certain weapons, and discrimination between civilians and combatants) and, despite 
Walzer’s misgivings,  more utilitarian ones (proportionality, chance of success). However, as we 
already noted, most militaries today  consider an aspirational virtue ethics approach as the best way 
to underpin the ethics education of military personnel that are actually carrying out military 
operations (Robinson 2007). The question is whether this approach is also the best one for the moral 
education of drone operators, and if it is, what virtues should hold central place in that virtue-based 
education. The more general, underlying question is whether what counts as a military virtue is place 
and time dependent; at first sight a convincing argument can be made that this is not the case. Some 
military virtues are valued in all times and places – mainly because they perform an important 
function in or for the military. Martial courage is, of course, the obvious example here, being the 
quintessential military virtue. But if we take a closer look at courage, it also becomes clear that 
drones bring us to a whole new ball game: its operators do not seem to need physical courage at all. 
Regarding other important military virtues appearing on military lists (see Robinson 2008), such as 
loyalty, discipline or obedience,  it is at the minimum unclear what beneficial  role they could have 
for operating armed drones.  
If we for the moment assume that traditional martial virtues such as physical courage are not 
the most relevant for drone operators, there are at least three possible answers to the question what 
we do need.  One could argue, of course, 1) that the virtue approach is the right one, but that we 
need virtues that are better suited for military personnel flying drones than the traditional rather 
bellicose ones are; or 2) that not only the virtue approach is the right one, but that the traditional 
virtues by and large suffice – with the caveat  that the use of drones does ask for new interpretations 
of these virtues; or, finally, 3) that virtues are of little help here and that we need something 
different altogether, presumably rule-based or utilitarian ethics, or a combination of both.  
 
‘New’ virtues for new tasks  
If we assume that the existing conceptions of current militaries’ virtues are of little use in regulating 
the conduct of drone operators, devising a new list of virtues would be a first possible way forward. 
In this line of thought, drone operators do need virtues, but not necessarily the traditional military 
ones. The virtues we teach military personnel are to fit their particular job, and the virtues that drone 
operators need are most likely more about exercising restraint than about demonstrating virtues 
such as courage, loyalty, and discipline. Such virtues of restraint are less military-specific, and could 
for instance be found among the more ‘general’ cardinal virtues. Interestingly, of the four cardinal 
virtues of courage, wisdom, temperance and justice, only courage has hitherto made it to the 
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traditional lists of military virtues and values, albeit not only in its Aristotelian form of physical 
courage on the battlefield, but also as moral courage. Wisdom, temperance and justice have not 
made it to most lists of military values, but are today probably as necessary as courage is (see Skerker 
et al. 2019). These virtues have a wider scope than the traditional military virtues, and incorporating 
them could have the collateral benefit that it would bring those parts of the military that would 
subscribe to these cardinal virtues in closer alignment with society at large.  Respect, incidentally, is a 
virtue that is listed by many militaries, but is evidently also deemed important in larger society. 
Opting for a set of virtues that is closer to the four cardinal virtues would also give us a set of virtues 
that does justice to the ancient idea that one cannot have one virtue without the others, and that all 
the virtues are interrelated. Being just is of little value if one lacks the courage to defend justice, for 
instance, while courage is of not much use without practical wisdom to guide it. The haphazard lists 
of virtues militaries now subscribe to (see Robinson 2008)  miss these interconnections. 
Yet one could also argue that devising a new list of virtues from scratch is perhaps a bridge 
too far for what is for the most part a relatively traditional organization. That the existing military 
virtues are ill-aligned does not necessarily mean we have to opt for different ones. Instead, one could 
also identify the weaknesses of the existing virtues and see if the way militaries interpret these 
traditional virtues can be improved. Although most militaries today cling to fairly traditional 
interpretations of the virtues, other readings are of course possible. The question is then not which 
new virtues the military should promote, but in what form the existing ones should best be 
understood. 
 
Interpreting the old virtues in new ways    
So a second way forward would be to interpret the existing virtues somewhat differently, more 
precisely: less narrowly, than is commonly the case (see Schulzke 2016, 195-6). The gist of the codes, 
oaths, and values (which, even if their actual influence is limited, at the minimum do communicate 
what an organization thinks important) as currently formulated in most militaries mainly pay 
attention to the organization and colleagues; there is little in them that regulates the behaviour of 
soldiers towards civilian populations. The virtue of courage is especially interesting in the context of 
unmanned warfare. We already noted above that at present most conceptions of military courage 
include moral courage, instead of being limited to more martial (physical) forms of courage. So it 
seems that courage means different things in different contexts. Aristotle, for instance, famously 
defined courage in his Nicomachean Ethics as the mean between rashness and cowardice,  and 
thought that this virtue is  especially needed in battle –  a brave man does not fear a noble death in 
war (Aristotle 1962).  This conception of courage as a mean fitted the ancient Greek phalanx 
formation very well, as both an excess or a deficiency of courage would destroy the organized whole 
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it was. But this martial notion of  courage is clearly worlds apart from what Gandhi envisioned when 
he pleaded for courageous but nonviolent resistance to British colonial rule –  that was about moral 
courage.  
Some years ago, Jesse Kirkpatrick (2015a/b) and Robert Sparrow (2015a) had an interesting 
although somewhat semantic discussion on the question whether or not drone operators possessed 
the virtue of courage. If a definite conclusion had to be drawn from that discussion, it would be that 
these operators do need courage, but more in the form of moral courage than martial courage. 
Seeing that drone operators run no significant physical risk (at least not in the current asymmetric 
conflicts) the term ‘martial courage’ is out of place here. Moral courage is an important subspecies of 
the virtue of courage as it asks us to uphold our principles even if others disagree, and perhaps hold 
us in contempt for sticking to them. As Ian Miller defines it, moral courage is ‘the capacity to 
overcome the fear of shame and humiliation in order to admit one’s mistakes, to confess a wrong, to 
reject evil conformity, to denounce injustice, and to defy immoral or imprudent orders’ (2000, 254). 
It is virtues such as these that have to provide guidance to military personnel in morally  
ambiguous  situations, seeing that providing general rules and guidelines for such complex situations 
will not work – militaries seem now and then even disinclined to give them (see for instance 
Whetham 2017). Peter de Lee (2019) gives an excellent example when he describes how an acting 
sergeant on her first day in a supervisory role overseeing a Reaper team stuck to her judgment, 
against the opinion of all present, that an alleged parcel placed on the back seat of a motorbike 
piloted by a Taliban target was in fact a child – which it in the end turned out to be. (She would have 
been equally courageous, of course, if the supposed parcel turned out to be precisely that – a parcel. 
But in that case it would perhaps have been more difficult to muster that same amount of moral 
courage at another time.)  
What is interesting here is that physical courage is primarily (though certainly not only) 
something one’s superiors and colleagues benefit from. Moral courage has a wider reach, and is, in 
line with the earlier mentioned distinction between an aspirational and a functional approach, more 
about being a better person than about being an effective soldier (compare Robinson 2007, 22; 
Robinson 2008, 1). This form of courage is not only important to the military because it needs 
personnel who dare to blow the whistle if necessary, but also because it benefits from soldiers who 
dare to correct colleagues when they think they act wrongly, or even report them if necessary. Its 
beneficiaries, today, are not only military colleagues, as is predominantly the case with physical 
courage, but, as the example of the acting sergeant clearly shows, also the outsiders (e.g. civilians in 
the vicinity of a planned drone strike) the military is there to protect. Moral courage can only 
perform that function if militaries allow room for it, however. The good thing is that militaries today 
rarely fail to at least pay lip service to moral courage, and they generally claim to deem it a plus to 
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have among its personnel principled people who dare to blow the whistle if necessary – or to stop a 
colleague who is about to commit a wrong. But although their definitions of courage include moral 
courage, in reality military organizations all too often offer a fairly unfriendly environment for acting 
on moral principles, especially when adherence to these principles appears to conflict with 
organizational interests or mission success. That drone pilots are probably less subject to the forces 
of peer pressure and group loyalty than other members of the military could make it easier for them 
to gather the moral courage that is needed to make right decisions or to display loyalty to principle 
instead of group loyalty (Lee 2012, 15).  
Loyalty is as often mentioned on lists of military virtues as courage is. But that same loyalty 
that militaries value so much is at the same time a cause of both unethical conduct and attempts to 
cover that conduct up.  To improve matters militaries could interpret loyalty in such a way as that it 
includes loyalty to a profession or principle, not just loyalty to one’s group and organization, as we 
now often see (see also Olsthoorn 2011). Loyalty to one’s professional ethic, instead of to one’s 
organization and colleagues, is nothing more or less than what is commonly understood to be one of 
the key characteristics of a professional, something military personnel claim to be.3 Of course, the 
position of a professional in a civilian occupation is essentially different from military personnel in a 
conflict zone. That civilian professional can put the interest of his clients above everything else 
without putting him- or herself in harm’s way, whereas a soldier cannot at all times act in the interest 
of the local population without incurring more risks to himself. For that reason, especially when we 
consider the fact that in the eyes of many the predominant task of most military organizations is still 
the defence of national territory, the emphasis on loyalty to the organization is not that surprising. 
The interesting thing here is, of course, that drone operators can take the interests of outsiders into 
account with no extra risk to themselves, and in that way the fact that the risks for this category of 
military personnel is effectively nil might open the door to a more professional – in the meaning of 
impartial – attitude.  One could even wonder whether, at a time when many armed forces consider 
the promotion of universal principles as their main ground for existence, the development of a truer 
professionalism, with the main focus of loyalty being the soldier’s professional ethic instead of his 
organization, is still too far-fetched.  
Respect, finally, was mentioned previously as a virtue valued by both the military and society 
at large. A closer look, however, reveals that respect in the military is now and then limited to 
respect toward colleagues. The US Army describes respect as, among other things, ‘trusting that all 
people have done their jobs and fulfilled their duty.’4 This definition seems to implicitly limit respect 
to colleagues. Here, too, a less narrow interpretation seems in place.5  
  
Rules and utility instead of virtues 
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A final way ahead would be to reconsider whether virtues in fact form the best underpinning for the 
ethics education for drone operators in the first place.  We saw that the traditional military virtues 
are of themselves already more inward looking than the cardinal virtues, but also on more a 
theoretical level virtue ethics is fairly self-regarding: virtue ethics focuses on the agent and his or her 
character and flourishing, even in situations (and war is probably such a situation) where an 
outcome-centred approach would seem to be more appropriate. Aristotle’s idea of virtue is on the 
whole a lot less attentive to the needs of others than is the utilitarian notion of the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number or the rule-based maxim to treat others same way you want them 
to treat you.6 Now, as we have seen, military ethicists often criticize utilitarianism because it would 
make military expedience outweigh all other concerns (see for instance Snow 2009, 560), but in fact 
the consequentialist precept that the consequences to all persons should weigh equally could, if 
taken seriously,  lead to a fairer distribution of the right to life. Utilitarianism does not condone the 
maximizing of our own utility, as some seem to hold, but that of all. This means that soldiers should 
take as much care, and run as much risk, to avoid casualties among enemy civilians as they would do 
for their own civilians (Shaw 2015).  Although such an impartial view may be expecting too much 
from regular soldiers in a regular war in defence of one’s own country, in many of today’s operations 
in which drones are used one probably should be able to do so a bit more easily. Even when enemy 
forces do little to avoid civilian casualties, or even target them deliberately, utilitarianism is not about 
fairness, but about minimizing the damage of warfare (Shaw 2015, 139–140). 
 As to rule-based ethics, in recent years, both Schulzke (2016) and Renic (2018, 194) have 
argued that more emphasis on rule-based approaches is in place in the case of drone operators –  the 
first-mentioned mainly on the ground that alternative  interpretations of the military virtues that 
would fit drone warfare are so different from the current ones. In defence of the somewhat more 
rudimentary form of rule-based ethics (rudimentary because it disregards the good intention most 
forms of rule-based ethics ask for)7 that we encounter in most militaries, one could argue 
that pointing out what is permitted and what is not, and what the consequences of transgressing 
these rules are, should also have a role in the ethics education for military personnel operating 
drones. Failing to do so can be costly for perpetrator and victim alike – something that can be 
overlooked in an ethics education that focuses too much on character development.  That universal 
rules lack flexibility is not always a problem; torture, as we already noted, is at present under every 
circumstance forbidden, and flexibility here could quickly bring us onto a slippery slope.  As said in 
the introduction, we do not leave the decision on these matters to individual soldiers, however 
virtuous they might be. The just war tradition is primarily founded on an ethic that stresses the 
importance of such universal, categorically binding moral rules (though, as we noted before, there are 
unmistakably also some consequentialist elements within the just war tradition). Clear rules have the 
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additional benefit that they can turn potential moral dilemmas into tests of integrity: it is clear what 
is the correct way to proceed, yet there is pressure (from peers, or the prospect of furthering one’s 
own interest) to follow a different course of action (Coleman 2009, 105-6).8 Research shows that 
military personnel who lack guidelines to deal with such morally critical situations experience more 
moral dilemmas, increasing the likelihood of moral injury (Schut 2015). This risk of moral injury is 
something that drone operators face too. Although in the past some argued that killing might get a 
bit easier with the increased physical and psychological distance between soldiers and the battlefield 
(see for instance Olsthoorn 2011, 126), we now know that ‘[p]hysical separation from the combat 
zone does not […] automatically lead to emotional disconnection. The crew of a Tornado flying at low 
level above an enemy contact may be more emotionally disengaged than the Reaper crew’ (Lee 
2012).  
 
Risk and the military profession 
In earlier days, bows, catapults and firearms have been vilified for being the weapon of choice of 
cowards, yet it seems that armed drones push things even a bit further by doing away with risk 
altogether – which raises the interesting question to what extent risk is fundamental to the (image of 
the) military profession, and whether the elimination of risk will change it. Although the use of 
drones is on first sight not very different (as long as such systems are not fully autonomous that is) 
from using an aircraft to drop a bomb from a high altitude, their rise makes it possible to engage the 
enemy from such a safe distance that it reduces the risks for their military operators to about zero. 
This reduction in risk to personnel could make one wonder whether the military profession becomes 
a less honourable one as a consequence, as honour often involves acting against one’s own self-
interest (including the preserving of life and limb) to further a higher interest. The difference 
between running a limited risk and running no risks is perhaps not merely gradual: ‘For men to join in 
battle is generally thought to be honourable, but not if they are so situated as to be able to kill others 
without exposing themselves to danger whatever’ (Welsh 2008, 4). The Time magazine journalists 
Ghosh and Thompson observed that people in Waziristan, the region in Pakistan where drones killed 
many Taliban leaders, see the use of drones as dishonourable and cowardly (2009).9 And, according 
to military ethicist George R. Lucas,   ‘the removal of any risk of harm to the military (…) seems 
grotesquely unfair, persecutory, oppressive, abusive, and therefore morally repugnant,’  reminding 
us ‘of the Death Star from Star Wars’  (2015, 175).  
Some militaries are aware of that problem, and attempt to draw the use of armed drones 
into the realm of honour. In an article in The New York Times (Schmidt 2016) of a few years ago we 




[f]or years, the military’s drone pilots have toiled in obscurity from windowless rooms at 
bases in suburban America, viewed by some in the armed forces more as video game players 
than as warriors. But in a reflection of their increasingly important role under President 
Obama, the drone operators will now be eligible for military honors akin to those given to 
pilots who flew over the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan.  
 
This new award can also be conferred upon US military personnel who launch a cyber-attack, the 
article continues. Although all of this – honouring the courage of what are sometimes somewhat 
derogatively called ‘cubicle warriors’ – might sound somewhat odd to many people, it fits well with 
the rise of ways of war fighting in which soldiers run less risk – in the same article we read that 
‘[a]ccording to the Pentagon, the first seven Medal of Honor awards for service in Iraq and 
Afghanistan were given to those who had died. But since 2010, all 10 people who have received the 
Medal of Honor have been living at the time it was awarded’ (Schmidt 2016) 
Most, however, will still feel that the use of armed drones is difficult to reconcile with what is 
commonly understood by the term ‘honourable’: incurring risk to oneself seems to be a vital part of 
it. Fighting one’s adversary from a low flying manned aircraft would indicate an acceptance of risk to 
oneself, but if that would also increase the risk to the local population one might ask what the point 
is. Dismissing the use of drones because their use is free of risk for the attacking side and thus 
dishonourable, might as a result boil down to accepting higher risks to oneself and the local 
population just to prove your honourableness (see also Strawser 2010). As that would be a 
distinctively unsatisfying option, we have to ask ourselves whether the language of honour is suited 
to describe drone warfare to begin with (see also Goldstein 2015, 75). That the drawbacks of military 
honour are as numerous as the advantages might form another reason to leave honour out of the 
equation (see also Sparrow 2015b, 390). What defines warriors is not so much their acceptance of 
risk, but the restraint with which they exercises violence (see also Renic 2018) – which brings us back 
to our earlier conclusion that for drone operators abiding by the rules is perhaps as important as 
exercising virtue.10  
Contrasting supposedly risk adverse drone pilots with the assumed death wish of, for 
instance, a suicide bomber is not going to be particularly helpful, though. The comparison echoes the 
occidentalist rhetoric of a feminine West that Al Qaida and ISIS are always eager to embrace. Buying 
into that ‘you love Pepsi, we love death’ rhetoric not only implies that drone operators are not 
honourable because they do not put their life at risk, but possibly also that we should deem their 
‘opposites’ (the death-seeking suicide bombers), honourable – not a conclusion many of us would 
want to accept. Risk aversion is not bad or dishonourable in itself; it is only a problem insofar as it 
comes at the cost of increased risk to the outsiders (civilians in foreign territories) the military should 
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defend if it wants to live up to its professed ambition to be a force for good. Perhaps the real issue 
deserving of our attention is that we are generally more concerned about casualties among our 
fellow countrymen and women than among unknown persons in far-away countries – this is perhaps 
to some extent understandable and natural, but certainly not moral. Or honourable, for that matter. 
 
Conclusion 
Apart from some academics who have a clear preference for virtue ethics, rule-based ethics or 
consequentialist ethics, in real life most people tend to see a role for both virtues and rules, and 
consider the consequences of an action as well (see also Nagel 1986, 166). They are probably quite 
right in doing so, and one could even argue that those involved in professional ethics education are 
more or less duty-bound to take a fairly comprehensive approach towards teaching ethics. That 
means paying attention to rules, virtues and consequences, but also to situational factors that make 
unethical conduct more likely to occur.11 What is clear though, is that some of the traditional martial 
virtues such as courage and loyalty are in their current interpretations less relevant for today’s drone 
operators. Especially the obsoleteness of physical courage – the willingness to incur risk to life and 
limb – in unmanned warfare has led to some not too helpful comments on its honourableness. 
Nonetheless, we do need to look for alternatives for the traditional military virtues, and in the above 
a few possible ways ahead have been outlined.  
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1 Virtues are typically described as stable character traits that are worth having, often working as 
correctives to our self-regarding inclinations (Foot 2002, 8-12). Most virtue ethicists hark back to the 
time-proven work of Aristotle, who held that we become virtuous by actually performing virtuous 
acts. Performing courageous deeds grows courage, for instance. It is this Aristotelian view on virtues 
that underlies most literature on military virtues too. As Robinson has explained, ‘The approach 
adopted in most armed forces is that of “virtue ethics,” with their philosophical origins found in 
Aristotle. Essentially, virtue ethics seeks to ensure moral behavior by instilling certain virtues (loyalty, 
honesty, and courage) to create good character. Consequently, many military academies have 
adopted an approach based on Aristotelian virtue ethics’ (Robinson 2007, 29). 
2 As one author writes, ‘utilitarianism would lend itself to abuse in precisely those kinds of situations 
in which ethical safeguards are most needed, and should, for this reason, be stricken from the list of 
viable alternatives for the military’ (Snow 2009, 560). According to Stephen Deakin ‘the utilitarianism 
ethic often does not work in a military community. It is not the ethic of a virtuous person desiring to 
do good in every circumstance (…). Rather, it is the ethic of a highly educated rational calculator who 
is constantly considering whether an action is harmful to the Army or not, and, inevitably, what he 
can get away with’ (2008, 24). 
3 Loyalty to the organization is the main aspect of military professionalism that is somewhat at odds 
with what a ‘regular’ professional ethic entails, and, in the past, some have for that reason 
maintained that the military profession was ill-suited to develop into a ‘true’ profession (see for 
instance van Doorn 1975). Armed forces socialize their employees thoroughly into the organization, 
which contributes to the strong loyalty military personnel feel towards each other and their 
employer. That military personnel are predominantly trained in house, whereas other professionals 
(such as doctors) as a rule receive most of their formal professional training before entering their job, 
makes this socialization into the organization, instead of into a profession, easier. As a consequence, 
different militaries have different organizational values (often still service specific), but there are as 
yet no values of ‘the military profession’ as such. By contrast, the values and standards of ‘regular’ 
professionals stem from universities and professional associations, not from their hospital or law firm 
(Mintzberg 1983, 192). 
4 The US Army values can be found at https://www.army.mil/values/. 
5 Military ethicist Timothy Challans describes how ‘early drafts of the Army’s 1999 leadership manual 
included the notion of respect; in fact, the key feature of respect was that of respecting the enemy 
on the battlefield. That idea did not survive the staffing process, and even a cursory check of the 
manual today will reveal that only Americans are mentioned as being recipients of this important 
value of respect’ (2007, 163).  
6 For Aristotle, the good life took precedence over the moral life (Nagel 1986, 195, 197). The virtue of 
justice is a possible exception; Aristotle deemed it the most complete virtue because the best person (?) 
is not he ‘who practices virtue toward himself, but who practices it toward others, for that is a hard thing 
to achieve’ (Nicomachean Ethics 1030a). cite “(Aristotle 1962: p#)” here? 
7 Although not asking anyone to go beyond the call of duty, rule-based ethics, especially as conceived 
by its main protagonist Immanuel Kant, can demand quite a lot from military men and women. In this 
understanding, moral duties are to be followed because one accepts them by choice, not because 
they are imposed from the outside and backed by sanctions (see also Martinelli-Fernandez 2006, 56-
7). 
8 Yet, although the distinction between ethical dilemmas and tests of integrity is an important and 
meaningful one, the situations in which this apparently straightforward distinction is blurred are the 
most interesting. For instance, it is generally thought that the loyalty one feels towards colleagues is 
nothing more than a pressure that can create a test of integrity. Loyalty is then viewed as the 
suspension of independent judgment, or the ‘willingness not to follow good judgment’ (Ewin 1992, 
412). But if loyalty amounts to a value, and for most members of the military it does, then there 
might be a dilemma again (see also Coleman 2009, 112). 
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9 Two weeks after the 9/11 attacks, Susan Sontag (2001) made a somewhat similar (and much 
criticised) remark:  ‘If the word “cowardly” is to be used, it might be more aptly applied to those who 
kill from beyond the range of retaliation, high in the sky, than to those willing to die themselves in 
order to kill others. In the matter of courage (a morally neutral virtue): whatever may be said of the 
perpetrators of Tuesday’s slaughter, they were not cowards.’  
10 One could argue, in addition, that ‘the value of military effectiveness should be held in higher 
esteem than that of mere physical risk in battle (…). [T]he ultimate mission of the military should be 
effective national defense and not heroism for heroism’s sake. Accordingly, the strategically effective 
logistician, drone pilot, or informational officer should be held in equal if not higher regard in the 
military of the twenty-first Century than that of the tactical level infantryman’ (Robillard 2017, 217). 
11 Like other military personnel, UAV operators are subject to situational forces that are much 
stronger than those most of us will ever encounter. Their ethics education should not only aim at 
furthering virtues, or respect for rules, but also at giving insight into the factors that make unethical 
conduct more likely to take place.  Factors such as negative peer pressure, dehumanization, stress, 
sleep deprivation, the national and organizational culture, but also the amount and kind of training 
and education received, perhaps influence our conduct more than our character does (Doris and 
Murphy 2007). The social psychologist’s advice to avoid morally challenging situations is clearly not 
very helpful for UAV operators, but with more knowledge about the influence of these factors, 
militaries can do more to make the erosion of moral standards less likely to occur. The insights social 
psychology offers should hence have a prominent place in the moral education of UAV personnel. 
However, as we noted, some of these factors might have less influence on UAV operators than on 
regular military personnel. 
